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ABSTRACT 
The separation of ownership and control in public listed companies limits the 
involvement of shareholders in management decision making, including capital 
structure decisions. In the capital structure decision-making process, managers 
always get to push through their preferences, which focus on debt instead of equity. 
Shareholders rely on the board of directors to evaluate and challenge management 
decisions.  This study examines the effect of board governance on company leverage 
that focus on how directors discharge their duties, referred to as the board process. 
Four variables of board process are analysed: performance of independent directors, 
board’s risk oversight, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) performance evaluation, and 
directors’ accessibility to information. Besides, the interaction between the 
manager’s ownership and the board process on company leverage is examined. This 
study also investigates the mediation effect of capital structure decisions on the 
relationship between board process and company performance. The study uses two 
types of data which are questionnaire survey of Malaysian directors and the 
companies’ annual reports. Based on returned questionnaires representing 175 
companies, results of the regression analysis indicate that directors with lower risk 
appetite and a more effective board are more likely to make less risky capital 
structure decisions. Moreover, owner-managers with large ownership influence the 
board’s capital structure decisions. The results also show that effective independent 
directors and boards who monitor company risks vigorously are more likely to 
monitor management from adopting excessive leverage, which results in positive 
company performance. The findings provide several implications for policymakers in 
terms of assessing existing guidelines, particularly related to board effectiveness. 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Board Process, Capital Structure Decisions, 
Company Performance 
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ABSTRAK 
 
Pengasingan di antara pemilikan dan penguasaan dalam syarikat penyenaraian awam 
menghadkan pembabitan pemegang saham dalam proses pembuatan keputusan 
termasuklah keputusan berkenaan struktur modal syarikat.  Dalam proses pembuatan 
keputusan struktur modal syarikat, pengurus kebiasaannya berkeupayaan untuk 
memenuhi kecenderungan mereka iaitu fokusnya adalah kepada hutang berbanding 
ekuiti.  Pemegang saham bergantung kepada ahli lembaga pengarah bagi menilai dan 
mencabar keputusan pihak pengurusan.  Kajian ini mengkaji kesan daripada tadbir 
urus ahli lembaga terhadap hutang syarikat yang menfokuskan terhadap pelaksanaan 
tugas oleh pengarah dan ia merujuk kepada proses ahli lembaga.  Empat 
pembolehubah yang dikaji di bawah proses ahli lembaga adalah prestasi pengarah 
bebas, pengawasan risiko oleh ahli lembaga, penilaian prestasi ketua eksekutif dan 
kebolehcapaian maklumat oleh pengarah.  Selain itu, interaksi di antara pemilikan 
oleh pengurus dan proses ahli lembaga terhadap hutang syarikat turut dikaji.  Kajian 
ini turut mengkaji akan kesan hutang syarikat sebagai pembolehubah penengah 
terhadap hubungan di antara proses ahli lembaga dan prestasi syarikat.  Kajian ini 
menggunakan dua jenis data iaitu soal-selidik kepada pengarah di Malaysia dan 
laporan tahunan syarikat.  Berdasarkan kaji selidik yang diterima yang mewakili 175 
buah syarikat,  hasil analisis regresi mendapati pengarah yang mempunyai 
kecenderungan terhadap risiko yang rendah dan lembaga pengarah yang lebih efektif 
akan lebih cenderung untuk membuat keputusan berkenaan struktur modal yang 
kurang berisiko. Kajian ini turut mendapati bahawa pemilik-pengurus yang 
mempunyai pemilikan yang besar dalam syarikat mempengaruhi keberkesanan ahli 
lembaga dalam membuat keputusan struktur modal syarikat. Hasil kajian turut 
menunjukkan pengarah bebas yang efektif dan ahli lembaga yang mengawasi risiko 
syarikat dengan teliti akan lebih mengawasi pihak pengurusan daripada mengambil 
hutang yang berlebihan dan ini memberi kesan positif terhadap prestasi syarikat. 
Hasil kajian menyumbang kepada beberapa implikasi terhadap penggubal polisi 
dalam menilai garis panduan sedia ada khususnya terhadap keberkesanan lembaga 
pengarah. 
 
Kata kunci: Tadbir Urus Korporat, Proses Ahli Lembaga, Keputusan Struktur 
Modal, Prestasi Syarikat 
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 1 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Background of the Study 
This study examines the relationship between board characteristics and capital 
structure decisions in Malaysia. Capital structure decisions are influenced by 
managers’ self-interests; thus, it is expected that their decisions might increase a 
company’s risks (Brailsford, Oliver, & Pua, 2002), which could also affect a 
company’s performance. Ownership structure also influences capital structure 
decisions (Arshad & Safdar, 2009; Lundstrum, 2009, Lin, Ma, Malatesta, & Xuan, 
2011). In light of such influences, it would be interesting to examine boards function 
and ownership structures as monitoring mechanisms for management decisions and 
actions, particularly in terms of influencing capital structure decisions. Capital 
structure decisions refer to decisions made about financing sources in which 
company leverage is represented. Four main attributes of board governance are 
identified as being associated with capital structure: board structure, composition, 
characteristic and process. Four elements that relate to board process are the 
performance of independent directors, the board’s risk oversight, the chief executive 
officer (CEO) performance evaluation, and the directors’ accessibility to information. 
 
The high leveraging of companies became particularly acute in 1997 and 1998, when 
it served as one of the factors resulting in the Asian financial crisis (Thomas, 2002; 
Driffield, Mahambare, & Pal, 2007). The crisis caused severe damage for Thailand, 
Indonesia, South Korea, and Malaysia. In the context of Malaysia, many companies 
were highly dependent on debt financing with banking institutions before the crisis 
The contents of 
the thesis is for 
internal user 
only 
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